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ABSTRACT  
 
 
This article is concerned with the potential of accountability to improve the performance of public 
urban services. A number of assumptions are made in the literature relating to accountability; these 
concern the necessity of multiple strategies of accountability, information symmetries, sanctions, trust, 
homogeneous service users, community-level answerability, incentives, self-regarding behaviour, and 
for users’ voice to be heard in service delivery. It is the purpose of this paper to reconsider these 
theoretical propositions for the functioning of accountability in light of practical experience from UK, 
South Africa, Bangladesh and South Korea. Each of these case studies was selected to illustrate a 
different form of accountability. The forms of accountability investigated in this research are 
professional, political, user and managerial accountabilities. An assessment is made of whether 
accountability is demonstrated in these case studies in the way predicted by the literature.  The 
empirical data demonstrates that factors like multiple strategies and information/resource symmetries 
are critical to accountability but that there is only partial evidence to support the need for sanctions, 
trust, incentives, self-interest, and user voice for effective service delivery. The research indicates the 
need for greater emphasis on the operation and maintenance of urban services and direct accountability 
to service users. However the assumption that service users are homogenous is disputed.  This article 
concludes with a review of the practical implications of strengthening accountability as a means to 
improve the performance of urban services.  
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INTRODUCTION  
 
“The success of service delivery depends on whether institutions of service provision are accountable 
to citizens” (Ahmed et al, 2004)  
 
This paper is concerned with accountability for urban services. The term ‘urban services’ refers to such 
services as water supplies, sanitation, drainage, access roads and paving, street lighting, solid waste 
management and community buildings.   
 
Stakeholders in developing countries and developed countries alike have concerns over aging and 
obsolete urban infrastructure, which is in need of repair, replacement and upgrading. Historically, the 
provision of urban services was seen as the responsibility of the state, yet internationally governments 
have been unable to provide, operate and maintain public services in line with rapid urbanization, 
resource deficiencies, poor urban management and population growth. Furthermore, supply driven 
approaches to service delivery are said to have created urban services that are inefficient, ineffective 
and unresponsive to local specificities (Rubin, et al 2004; Henry, 2002). The consequences of these 
failures are of particular importance to poorer and discriminated against people, who typically lack 
both equitable access to public services as well as effective mechanisms to ensure that their voice is 
heard in service delivery (Narayan et al., 2000; 270).   Instead it is argued that a more performance-
oriented approach to service provision is required (Osbourne and Gaebler, 1993; Luce & Henry, 2002; 
Miller, 2002; Hunsaker, 2001; Padmanabhan and Katti, 2002; Zitomer, Gabor & Johnson, 2003).   
 
A renewed emphasis on the outputs of urban services has put the issue of accountability on the agenda.  
Enthusiasts in donor agencies and academia alike see improved outputs, greater responsiveness to the 
needs of service users and sustainability as a likely consequence of greater urban service accountability 
(World Bank, 2004; Cywinski, 2001; Siller, 2001; Steinmann, 2003; Rassafi & Bagheri, 2002). 
Accordingly, attention has been given to apply ethics to engineering (Grant, 2001; Cochran, 2002; 
Lang, 2003) together with ways of increasing opportunities for service users to express their demands 
through voice and consumer style behaviour as well as making the public sector more accountable in 
the provision of urban services.   
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WHAT IS ACCOUNTABILITY? 
 
By way of general definition: “A is accountable to B when A is obliged to inform B about A’s (past or 
future) actions and decisions, to justify them and to suffer punishment in the case of eventual 
misconduct” (Schedler in Schedler, Diamond, Plattiner, 1999). Jabbra and Dwivedi (1989) argue that 
the term ought to include administrative, legal, professional, political and moral components. O’Donnel 
(1999) states that accountability operates in different directions, and has distinguished between 
horizontal accountability (the capacity of state institutions to check abuses by other public agencies and 
branches of government) and vertical accountability (the means through which citizens, mass media 
and civil associations seek to enforce standards of good performance on officials). Recently, citizens 
have been involved directly in the workings of horizontal accountability institutions, for example, 
through public hearings or participatory auditing. Goetz and Gaventa (2001) call this “diagonal 
accountability”.  
 
HOW DOES ACCOUNTABILITY WORK? 
 
The “principal agent” theory is typically used to analyse the problem of accountability. This framework 
describes a relationship in which a principal (service users in this case) attempts to secure services from 
an agent (service providers). Agents are expected to hide the information that principals require to 
monitor their performance and, thus, contracts, incentives and sanctions are needed to induce agents to 
deliver the desired type and level of performance. Accountability arrangements can foster better 
services by reducing the transaction costs of service users incurred in monitoring service delivery. It is 
suggested that greater accountability will then promote improved capacity and ability of local 
government to meet the challenges of urban service provision. 
 
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR URBAN SERVICES 
 
Accountability has emerged as an international issue, and talk of accountability has become 
commonplace in service delivery debate (Paul, 2002; Goetz and Gaventa, 2001; Deichmann & Lall, 
2003; Rakodi, 2003; Grindle, 2003; Casely, 2003; World Development Report, 2004). Where once the 
focus of accountability was on government, attention is increasingly paid to the relationship between 
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front line service providers and users. Proponents of more accountability claim that frontline service 
providers have too much discretion, and too few sanctions, in the context of bureaucratic, centralized 
service provision. This has allowed service providers to become untrustworthy, unaccountable and 
unproductive. Accountability can be improved by service users participation in service delivery, for 
example in setting performance plans, goals and standards for service delivery as well as evaluating 
services in terms of outcomes. User voice can have a disciplining effect, ensuring that service delivery 
becomes more efficient and effective (Devas & Grant, 2003).  
 
The main reasons advanced for applying accountability to the delivery of urban services can be 
summarised as: 
• Incentives: To reduce the discretion of front line service providers in decision-making at the point 
of delivery.   
• Information symmetries: Greater accountability can make information on the performance of 
services more widely available.  
• Users’ voice: Attempts are being made to rework the relationships involved in service delivery so 
that service providers are more directly accountable to service users.  
• Sanctions: Accountability arrangements can change levels of tolerance for poor service, leading 
citizens to reveal their demand for better quality and more accountable urban services at the 
community level.   
• O&M is neglected in practice: Greater accountability to service users is thought to lead to better 
monitoring of quality and standards of service, and more effective use of resources.   
• Community-level answerability: As well as extending access to urban services greater 
accountability of service providers and policy makers can be used to protect the quality of supply 
available to marginal and excluded groups in society. 
• Trust: Antipathy towards provision of urban services by a large, hierarchical, public sector has led 
to attempts to reduce and reorganise the public sector and improve the accountability of its 
activities.   
• Multiple strategies of accountability: In some countries the private sector, NGOs and community-
based organisations are service providers.  Attention is being paid to the allocation of 
accountability in the context of fragmented service delivery. 
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• Homogeneous service users: There is an implicit assumption that the rich and poor are able to 
secure accountability for urban services through similar sets of relationships.  
• Self-interest/self-regarding behaviour: Service users and providers are essentially deemed self-
interested and utility maximising 
 
METHODOLOGY  
 
A literature review revealed a number of propositions for the effective functioning of accountability; 
these included the need for multiple strategies of accountability, information symmetries, sanctions, 
trust, homogeneous service users, community-focused answerability, incentives, self-interest/self-
regarding behaviour, and users’ voice. Using the case study methodology, this research set out to test 
these propositions. Case studies were chosen from the UK, South Africa, Bangladesh and South Korea 
on the basis a known improvement to accountability for urban services. The research findings are based 
on information collected from semi-structured interviews with front line service providers, closed 
answer questionnaires with service users, document review, and direct observation in both deprived 
and non-deprived areas of the study locations. A random survey of about 100 respondents was conducted in 
deprived (squatter settlements) and non-deprived areas of Mdantsane, Dhaka and Seoul, and was intended to give 
an overall impression of user satisfaction rather than a statistically significant sample. The data was collected 
between July 2002 and July 2003. A short case study is given below and summarised in table 1, before 
the key findings from an initial data analysis are presented. 
 
THE CASE STUDIES  
 
The Bristol case study illustrates professional accountability through attempts to improve the design 
and delivery of services as well as the self-regulation of service providers through professional, ethical 
and technical standards. Service delivery has been redesigned to create integrated and more locally 
responsive delivery of waste collection, street cleaning, grounds maintenance, household bulky waste 
collection, gully emptying and recycling services in a neighbourhood of Bristol called Barton Hill. 
Project Pathfinder is a partnership between Bristol City Council, SITA GB Ltd, ResourceSaver (an 
NGO which operates the kerbside “black box” recycling collection service under sub-contract) and 
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Community at Heart (a resident-led organization established to deliver the New Deal for Communities 
anti-deprivation programme in the area). The principles of Pathfinder include the location of a multi-
skilled team in a dedicated area, with a local one-stop shop to act as a coordinating base; better 
customer relations; and more efficient and effective service provision.  
 
The South African study focuses on political accountability in attempts to get more appropriate and 
accessible urban services. This study makes reference to popular participation in government service 
delivery through direct and representative methods. Local government in South Africa is supposed to 
be developmental (i.e. it works with citizens to find sustainable ways of meeting their needs and improving the 
quality of their lives) and the Municipal Structures Act (1998) outlines the role of ward committees as a 
key mechanism for involving communities in matters of service delivery. Ward committees assist and 
advise their ward councillor, act as a communication channel between the community and ward 
councillor, ensure that their ward councillor accounts for his/her actions, and encourage resident 
participation in attempts to improve the quality of life in their ward. Observations are based on a study 
of a suburb of Buffalo City called Mdantsane, which, under apartheid, was developed as a township. 
 
The Bangladeshi case study is intended to illustrate attempts to increase user accountability in Dhaka; 
this approach is based on ideas of empowerment, and is intended to overcome producer dominance.  
Two specific forms of user accountability in Dhaka were investigated that reflect the growing voice of 
civil society for more accountable and better quality services: a Scorecard to assess public service 
delivery in terms of performance and the degree of satisfaction with services as well as the co-
production between Dhaka City Corporation, NGOs and community initiatives to fill the gaps in urban 
service provision, for example in waste collection and water and sanitation projects.  
 
The South Korean case study illustrates managerial accountability through improvements to the 
responsiveness of service providers in Seoul.  Complaints are recognized as an important way to 
monitor service performance in this model.  Following the IMF crisis in 1997, Mayor Goh 
implemented a reform of Seoul Metropolitan Government on the basis of zero tolerance of corruption.  
Mayor Goh abolished public officials discretionary power, transparency was increased through “benign 
ethical competition” between departments (as promoted by the Citizen Evaluative Survey); as well as 
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online information disclosure systems; meetings with citizens (Saturday Date with the Mayor); and 
Corruption Report Card to the Mayor.  
 
TESTING THE PROPOSITIONS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY  
 
The literature presents a range of factors that influence accountability for service provision, which are 
often taken as given in theory and practice.  However, these propositions frame the way in which urban 
services are presented, and their problems are understood. They also have implications for the 
particular nature and role that accountability has been set up to play. It is important therefore that these 
assumptions are identified and tested.  The intention here is to problematize the meaning of 
accountability by reconsidering these propositions in light of the practical experience and empirical 
data documented in the fieldwork. In particular, these assumptions are tested to see if accountability is 
demonstrated in the case studies in the way predicted by the literature review, and the usefulness of 
these propositions is reviewed.  These findings are summarised in Table 2.  
 
• Multiple strategies  
The literature suggests that accountability works best when multiple strategies are encouraged. The 
case studies seem to support the proposition. 
  
Finding: Respondents from deprived areas use multiple strategies to cope with failing services. 
The research showed that when respondents in deprived areas encountered a problem with urban 
services they were more likely to contact or vote for a politician, hold a public meeting, join a user 
group, protest or demonstrate, or organise a petition.  Furthermore, deprived respondents tended to seek 
collective, rather than individual forms of accountability. The poor tended to have a repertoire of 
accountability related activities and strategies to deal with failing urban services, presumably just as 
they adapt, change and diversify their survival strategies.  In contrast, wealthier respondents from non-
deprived areas tended to have one predominant strategy, which is a dependence on the mechanisms 
offered by service providers (free phones, Internet sites, visits to offices, suggestion boxes and so on).  
Respondents in non-deprived areas seemed more satisfied with urban services than those who preferred 
ad-hoc accountability arrangements. Whilst service provider-related mechanisms for accountability 
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seem to work better than ad hoc arrangements in terms of improving services, it is unclear whether 
these channels would be as effective for poorer respondents.  
 
Finding: Accountability isn’t something that is achieved once and for all. Accountability was lost 
and regained many times in the case study experiences.  For example, accountability for urban services 
in Bristol has been lost at times because of SITA’s resources constraints and operational needs.  This 
loss of accountability made residents suspicious that they were being manipulated or co-opted 
according to agendas that are hidden to them, and feeling that accountability may be used as a PR tool 
whilst business goes on as usual.  The key to effective delivery of urban services is that service users 
know how to re-establish accountability. 
 
Finding: There is a need to review how accountability is defined. Service providers and users in the 
case studies had somewhat conflicting ideas of accountability.  Service providers considered 
themselves accountable for technically competent service delivery.  Service provider’s definitions of 
accountability tended to reflect answerability for their decisions or action.  But accountability was 
differently constructed from users point of view.  Most service users thought providers ought to be 
accountable for ensuring participation in decision making and responding to users complaints.   
 
Finding: Accountability only exists insofar as people use it. In Dhaka it was stated that slum 
dwellers now ‘play’ with service providers in their attempts to get better services. In this metaphor 
accountability doesn’t have an inherent existence unless people engage with it, perform it, or take part 
in it.  Playing requires service users and providers to be more creative and adaptive, instead of sticking 
to procedures in a rigid or systematic way.  Playing also requires service providers expand 
preconceived notion of limits to their responsibility.   
 
 
• Information and other resource symmetries  
Information on the performance of services can overcome weak horizontal accountability between 
policymakers and providers, create competition in service delivery (in terms of political and 
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commercial reputations of service provides) and solve collective action problems for service users. The 
case studies seem to support the proposition. 
 
Finding: Information asymmetries had been reduced in service delivery. Information asymmetries 
had been addressed in the case studies in a variety of ways. For example, in Seoul the Internet was used 
to maximise the accessibility of service providers to citizens by cutting through administrative 
complexity and red tape. In Bristol residents were given a copy of the street cleansing schedule and 
cleanliness standards to enable them to monitor standards of service delivery.  In all cases a 
sympathetic media had a key role as both a watchdog on service providers, awareness raising tool, and 
a communication channel for the public.  This research also raised the issue of information 
asymmetries between front line service providers and management   
 
Finding: Information asymmetries can be reduced through dialogue. The accountability ‘problem’ 
has been articulated as one of communication.  Improved communication, and especially ‘voice’, is 
needed to better understand customers’ needs and priorities, as well as make services more efficient 
and effective.  The distinction can be made between the kinds accountability for urban services that 
provide a top down, one-way transmission of information from service providers to service users, such 
as an explanation or justification for decisions, and those that propose a dialogue between service 
providers and users.   
 
Finding: Accountability needs to be sustained. The sustainability of accountability itself was raised 
as a concern in the fieldwork.  Certain service users preferred to engage with accountability in an ad 
hoc or disorganised way, with daily interactions with service providers more important in securing 
accountability than formal organisations.  Initial enthusiasm in accountability reforms was found to 
wane as problems with services are solved, or when resource constraints prevented on-going action. 
Accountability was also seen to dissipate once political terms of office were up, or whenever 
contentious, long term and unpopular issues arose. In addition, where community participation had led 
to greater demands for local control over resources and more active involvement in decision-making, 
service provider enthusiasm for accountability has cooled. 
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Finding: Accountability has a number of costs.  The case studies demonstrated the costs of being 
accountable, for example in complying with accountability requirements, opportunity costs or 
alternatively the costs involved in attempting to avoid accountability or circumvent inspection. 
 
 
• O&M is neglected in practice 
Operation and repair is critical to the success of urban services, however, in practice urban services 
often fail in terms of quality and quantity.  Failing services has created a logic and legitimacy for 
greater accountability. The case studies demonstrate partial support for this claim. 
 
Finding: The case studies showed that the most important outputs of service delivery are not 
always measurable. The literature advocates the use of performance indicators and reporting systems 
to judge the effectiveness of service delivery.  The case studies showed that the outputs of service 
delivery are not always measurable.  For example, in Bristol the main benefits of the service were in 
the way front line service providers improved the quality of life for residents in their role as informal 
community wardens, rather than the tonnage of waste collected.  In Seoul, the principal benefit of 
accountability was to make it physically, socially and psychologically easier for citizens to approach 
the city hall, and in Mdantsane and Dhaka accountability led to empowerment and mobilisation at the 
grassroots level.  
 
Finding: O&M of urban services is often not a priority for municipalities. In certain cases public 
service providers did lack planned maintenance schedules and showed no evidence pointing to strategic 
approaches.  O&M of urban services is often not a priority for municipalities, despite the on-going and 
widespread nature of problems with O&M.  In Dhaka and Mdantsane service delivery was constrained 
by a lack of detailed records indicating asset location and condition at the ward level.  Yet, in other 
cases, central and local government have taken the lead in improving O&M.  
 
Finding: Effective O&M was improved by partnerships. The accountability arrangements 
demonstrated in the case studies typically involved building partnerships or alliances between business, 
public institutions and voluntary sectors.  These kinds of partnerships required shared values, the 
resources to sustain partnerships, communication channels, as well as a sense of solidarity and 
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motivation among multiple stakeholders.  Partnerships were particularly important in deprived areas 
because many respondents reported multiple needs that are only capable of being solved by co-
operation (such as poor environment, chronic health problems, stress, crime, low incomes, 
unemployment, poor housing, discrimination) that are complex and for which no single agency have 
specific responsibilities.  In cases where community groups and a utility have co-produced O&M, this 
has reaped substantial benefits for low-income communities, as in Dhaka. 
 
Finding: Innovation in service delivery promoted O&M. Many of the examples of accountability 
described in the case studies involved experimentation with service delivery, like water and sanitation 
projects in the slums of Dhaka.  Many of these instances involved NGOs, who were relatively less 
accountable than government, and so have the flexibility to innovate and pilot new approaches to 
service delivery in deprived communities.  Enthusiastic, charismatic and influential people often 
initiated the accountability arrangements, these people often had an ambitious personal commitment to 
greater accountability, and the ability to mobilise resources.   
 
Finding: Accountability is also necessary within service provider agencies. There is a tendency to 
see accountability exclusively in terms of external relations between service providers and service 
users.  The accountability of management to front line service providers within service delivery 
agencies has been overlooked.  Management are accountable to staff, to whom they have obligations as 
employers in employment legislation and regulations to prevent discrimination.  They have 
responsibility to promote equality in fair employment practices, implement whistle blowing 
procedures, as well as for training to develop knowledge and expertise. 
 
• Sanctions are needed for accountability  
Service providers are often at an advantage in service provision in terms of knowledge and power.  
Service providers can be made more accountable through improved supervision, together with 
professional sanctions and fostering citizen’s voice and choice in service delivery. The case studies 
seem to partially support the proposition. 
 
  
 12
Finding: In practice service users have few sanctions to use as leverage to demand better services. 
The theory suggests that, to be fully accountable, implies the use of sanctions.  Although attempts were 
made to draw service users in as monitors of service delivery, users typically lacked effective sanctions 
to enforce a favourable response.  Scott (1985) talks about ‘weapons of the weak’ through which 
subordinate groups can critique the powerful in society, for example, backbiting and grumbling and 
these strategies were very much in evidence in the deprived areas of the case studies.  
 
Finding: The role of payment for services as a sanction in service delivery. The theory suggests 
that payment for services can amplify voice and make service providers responsive to needs if payment 
is withheld.  However, the case studies revealed that, withholding payment was an ineffective way of 
seeking to improve services, often resulting in disconnections rather than better services.  Furthermore, 
some respondents were willing to trade reduced service levels, and potentially reduce accountability, 
for lower council tax.   
 
Finding: Embedding service providers in communities can be a disincentive to front line service 
providers. SITA planned to recruit staff for the Pathfinder team from staff who lived locally.  
However, this strategy failed precisely because of the kind of local accountability it would involve.  
Some people didn’t apply for the project because they didn’t want to be ‘bothered in the pub on a 
Friday night’ by disgruntled residents.   
 
Finding: Forms of accountability can be traded off against each other. In the Dhaka frontline 
workers are presented with a moral obligation (and financial incentive through bribes) to provide 
services to citizens regardless of the legal status of their dwellings.  Moral accountability in this case 
led to water and sanitation projects in slum areas, made possible by loopholes in bureaucratic 
procedures – lack of administrative accountability. However, slum dwellers lack legal accountability 
and are unable to prevent evictions, despite paying for services.  It was also clear in Mdantsane that 
accountability outcomes may be partially exclusive of each other.  For example, water meters (and 
charging for water) might make services more financially accountable, but does not accord with users 
sense of social justice, i.e. moral accountability. 
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Finding: International pressures can be effective in making urban service delivery accountable to 
citizens. The World Bank and IMF have played key a role in promoting accountability initiatives at 
various times in UK, South Korea, Bangladesh, and South Africa, and aid conditionality has been as a 
sanction to discipline providers and substitute for weak voice of users.  Ferguson’s  (1994) work is 
instructive in this case.  He talks about the tendency of development agencies to perform sensitive 
political operations under the cover of neutral, technical operations. 
 
 
• Service providers are untrustworthy 
The institutions traditionally responsible for service delivery have been accused of abusing the trust of 
citizens, for example, in the use of public money as well as their capacity for impartial and predictable 
provision of urban services.  Distrust has created a context conducive to demands for greater 
accountability. The case studies partly support the proposition. 
 
Finding: Trust does matter in service delivery. Respondents in this research stated that, on the 
whole, they didn’t trust services providers, but have no choice but to use certain services everyday, e.g. 
water supply.  It might be concluded that trust is not important where there is no choice in service 
delivery.  However, in Seoul respondents’ distrust of the quality of tap water means scarce resources 
are diverted from core activities into information creation and dissemination.   
 
Finding: Levels trust varies with the service provider. Respondents seemed to have a higher level of 
trust in local government that in the private sector.  For example, in Bristol, although residents 
‘complain endlessly’ about the council there is still an implicit confidence in them.  Private sector 
involvement, on the other hand, can lead to mistrust, uncertainty and suspicion in service delivery and 
increase demands for regulation.  The research demonstrates that trust in the private sector depends on 
service providers offering a level of care and interest in service users beyond the cash contract, for 
example by attending community events. 
 
 
 
• Homogeneous service users  
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The literature tends to view service users either as a homogenous group, or else focuses on specific 
groups, such as poor people without recognising the range of service users and the interaction between 
these social groups. The case studies do not support the proposition 
 
 
Finding: Some groups are better placed for acting on accountability arrangements. Certain 
service providers had little sympathy for people in deprived areas because, although they tend to have 
chronic and repetitive complaints about urban services, it was suggested that the residents tend to cause 
the problems themselves by blocking drains with solid waste, putting stones down the toilets, or 
dropping food wrappers in the streets. Service providers’ responses made a moral distinction between 
the ‘virtuous’ service users, who should be helped, and the ‘undeserving’ users who get what they 
deserve because of their attitudes and behaviour.  Nonetheless, other service providers were 
sympathetic and conscientious about expanding the service to slums, and improving service delivery in 
low-income areas. 
 
Finding: Focusing on individual accountability of front line service providers is a symptomatic 
approach to a structural problem. The theory suggests that accountability in the provision of urban 
services requires a change in the attitudes, values and expectation of the individual.  This assumption 
has parallels with those theories of development that require socio-economic change to be 
complemented by a change in the individual.  However, the research shows that it is an important to 
adopt a systematic approach to accountability, which addresses the position of deprived people in 
society as well as the individual’s values.  
  
 
• Service providers should be answerable to the community  
The literature suggests that accountability should be ‘dis-intermediated’ i.e. service providers should be 
directly accountable to service users; potentially this can remove rent seeking ‘middlemen’, such as 
policymakers. The case studies partly support the proposition. 
 
Finding: Political accountability continues to have an important role in the delivery of urban 
services. The separation of responsibility for policy, service provision, and monitoring is thought to 
improve accountability in the provision of urban services.  Despite attempts to flatten accountability, 
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respondents in the case studies revealed that local politicians remain key channels for complaints about 
urban services, both at central government and ward level.  Political accountability is important in the 
sense of re-intermediating the more vulnerable service users.  However, this finding might also 
indicate the existence of patron-client relations in service delivery.  Residents may have in effect traded 
their civic rights for material benefits and tenure security (Varley 1999).   
 
Finding: The extent to which accountability arrangements have made society more governable is 
debateable. In cases where accountability arrangements have coordinated users voice, such as ward 
committees in South Africa, this appears to have generated a consensus on a range of conflicting 
interests, reduced the number of competing claims on financially limited resources, and increased the 
efficiency both in responding to complaints and in the use of resources.  However, in other cases where 
accountability arrangements have fragmented users voice, this can mean more problems are presented 
than can be dealt with by local government, which may lead to failure of services and governance. 
 
Finding: Thought should be given to how to scale up accountability from the project context. 
Where projects have created ‘islands’ of accountability within cities (such as Project Pathfinder in 
Bristol, ward committees in Mdantsane and NGO service delivery in Dhaka), it is thought to promote 
competitive pressures in service delivery.  However ‘islands’ of accountability raise concerns about ‘a 
postcode lottery’ of geographically varying outputs in service delivery, in addition to broader concerns 
about how to replicate and scale up accountability to larger areas. 
 
Finding: Accountability reflects the broader socio-political context. South Korea, Bangladesh and 
South Africa have relatively recent experience of civil society demanding democratic reforms of the 
ruling authoritarian regime.  These case studies highlight the role of civil society in promoting vertical 
accountability, particularly through alliances of civic associations.  The case studies revealed that the 
respondents in deprived areas typically relied on previously successfully tactics (such as collective 
pressure, demos, public protests) to highlight problems with service delivery. 
 
Finding: Accountability is improved through local action. Accountability for community level 
services can be described as a public good, and so suffers from collective action failures.  Whether 
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users take responsibility for shared services depends on their stake in the service, the incentive for 
action, and the kind of problem presented (i.e. breakdown or chronic issues that can be endured for 
long time).  Introducing accountability reforms in conjunction with community development work 
seemed to prove complementary, where efforts to organise, support and involve residents in urban 
service delivery served to increase incentives for action and to foster stability in areas of high resident 
turnover. 
 
 
• Service providers and users need incentives for action  
Reforms in the delivery of urban services have focused on the incentives (often financial) needed to 
ensure that service providers focus on the outputs of services and results in service delivery, and have 
an interest in finding and fixing problems.  Service users also need incentives to monitor urban services 
and overcome collective action failures. The case studies partly support the proposition.  
 
Finding: Users don’t necessarily require individual incentives to take action in service delivery.  
In interviews officials bemoaned the lack of community ownership of infrastructure in Mdantsane, 
citing the theft of cables, handrails, or manholes covers.  However, residents demonstrated community 
ownership, such that slum dwellers often rely on residents in formal housing for their water supply and 
local strategies to reinstall disconnected services, undo flow restrictors, and reduce the cost of service 
through meter tampering.  
 
Finding: Recognition should be give to the range of motivations affecting service providers. The 
research found that incentives relevant to more uniform and equitable provision of service are not 
necessarily associated with material benefits, but can be ideological, political or moral values, such as 
solidarity, mutual responsibility, and common good.  The Project team in Bristol demonstrated an 
unusual commitment from low wage employees.  Under Project Pathfinder, front line service providers 
gained work satisfaction and personal status, they felt empowered by jobs, could act under their own 
initiative, had the flexibility to tailor services to customers, and to deal with emergency repairs.   
 
Finding: Front line service providers need discretion to be effective. The case studies revealed how 
service users needs vary widely over the city.  The diversity of operational situations means service 
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providers cannot always respond according to formal procedures.  The research confirmed that front 
line workers demonstrated discretion in deciding who gets what and where, prioritising resources and 
repair work. This was done according to personal, private interests, rather than technical criteria based 
on efficiency. 
 
 
 
• Service providers and users are self-interested  
Service users and providers are essentially deemed self-interested and utility maximising.  Strategies of 
accountability for urban services are often based on the ‘primacy of the personal’ (Chambers, 1993) 
and methodological individualism - the well being of society as dependent on individuals and small 
groups pursuing their own interests.  
 
Finding: The research showed that service providers and users are not necessarily self-interested. 
Accountability presupposes self-interest and individualism.  However, the case studies highlighted 
instances where providers act altruistically by taking on more work to improve service delivery.  This 
evidence stands in opposition to a critique that blames indifferent and lazy front line providers as 
obstacles for delivering services to the poor.  Service users overcome free rider incentives and take 
action to improve neighbourhood level services, and further common interest.  
 
Finding: Accountability requires a perception of shared responsibility. Service users are 
responsible for the O&M of urban services within their property boundary.  However, service providers 
complain residents are slow to meet their responsibilities.  For example, in Seoul residents are required 
to clean their water tanks once a year and replace their plumbing systems regularly to protect water 
quality and facilitate the detection of leakage – yet few do so.  In Mdantsane officials recognised that 
residents were still adjusting to their new responsibilities for household level services, which under 
homeland rule were the responsibility of the local authority. 
 
Finding: Service users and providers have different interests in service delivery, but may share 
wider concerns. Castells (1977, 1983) argued that those who administer services, those who provide 
them, and those who consume them share a common interest in service delivery because they all derive 
some benefit from the service.  However, the research showed that it is more likely that, when faced 
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with a problem, there will be fragmentation of interests (Dunleavy, 1980; Saunders 1986).  
Furthermore, the research found that service users and providers may share wider concerns based on 
social symmetry in service delivery based on ethnic, religious, family ties to the neighbourhood (Yin, 
1982).  Accountability was improved where service providers are visible, better known, and more 
rooted in neighbourhoods where they work and are likely to understand from their own experience 
what is going on in the neighbourhood. 
 
 
• User voice is needed for effective service delivery 
The benefits of increased ‘voice’ in service delivery are to match services outputs to demands, and to 
discipline service providers.  Strengthening service users voice and participation can further increase 
user satisfaction with service delivery. 
 
Finding: The respondents from deprived areas thought that they did have a voice in service 
delivery. The research revealed that perceptions of having a voice in service delivery were often 
associated with respondents living in deprived areas.  However it was clear that service providers did 
not feel equally accountable to all service users and while the poor felt they have a voice in service 
delivery it is clearly not a very powerful or effective one since service levels in their neighbourhoods 
remain technically inadequate.  VIP people tended to go straight to the Managing Director or the chief 
engineer with complaints, and had the ability to demand special treatment from service providers, such 
as not paying the full costs of services. 
 
Finding: User satisfaction may still be low even if services meet technical targets for service 
delivery.  Securing customer satisfaction has been frustrating for service providers in Seoul, when, 
despite all their efforts, services are failing to meet the expectations of more informed, motivated, 
effective and empowered citizens.  In Dhaka one service provider stated that even ‘if everyone is 100% 
satisfied, they will still expect more’.  The Project Pathfinder has the best standard of work in Bristol, 
yet the majority of residents interviewed said there had been no improvements in services or the 
appearance of the area in the last three years.  Similarly, in Buffalo City people expect a higher 
standard of service than those set out in the RDP, they aren’t satisfied with gravel roads, pit latrines and 
standpipes, even when these are an improvement to previous standards of service. 
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IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESEARCH FINDINGS  
 
 
This section presents the implications of the research findings for the existing theory and future 
practice of accountability for the delivery of urban services.  
 
The most striking research finding was that the service user-provider relationship is not always the 
central dynamic in service delivery. For instance accountability is often carried out through a variety of 
strategies, which in combination are effective. However multiple strategies of accountability make it 
difficult to evaluate the contribution of each approach.  
 
Service providers must work closely with politicians, since the research showed that local councillors 
are often keenly aware of users problems. The scrutiny function of councillors in service delivery 
requires new ways of working and competencies together with new ways to engage with communities 
and reflect local priorities. The case studies highlighted the need for balance between decentralisation 
to respond to needs at local level and central government initiative, coordination and resources. 
 
The evidence that mechanisms to raise consumers voice will discipline service providers is partial. 
Accountability to users tends to be stronger where users have higher status. More especially, paying 
user charges is not very effective as leverage to demand better performance and accountability.  In the 
context of developing countries resource constraints in service delivery may make this strategy 
particularly counterproductive. 
 
Accountability creates greater expectations in service delivery; service providers should be prepared 
for a dip in satisfaction levels following a reform.  High rates of dissatisfaction with urban services 
suggest potential governance problems. Some respondents had no idea that positive changes had taken 
place in service delivery; lack of information often means low satisfaction with outputs. 
 
Certain service providers interviewed revealed prejudices against ‘the kind of people’ that live in low-
income neighbourhoods, they were characterised as troublesome, difficult to please, or threatening, 
with little self-respect, pride, or dignity. However, accountability worked well where front line 
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providers are visible, known in the neighbourhood, and there was some social symmetry in power/class 
relations. The case studies revealed that service providers can also be a source of neighbourhood pride, 
broker for power on behalf of residents, and advocate for their rights. Nevertheless, the current focus 
on the accountability of individual front line provider is at the expense of more general patterns of 
inequality or discrimination, for which no one actor is responsible. 
 
The research showed that services users are often the most powerful advocates on accountability issues 
because they can speak with direct experience of service delivery and its consequences. However, 
people living in deprived areas had different perceptions of rights and worth, which affect the belief 
that it is possible to challenge service provision, or else mean that people do not perceive an injustice in 
service delivery. While personal status might not affect the level of participation in service delivery, it 
does affect the kind of participation selected. In a well-defined geographic area, where the community 
have been organised and have access to resources, people may be more willing to take action to defend 
their interests. Accountability for urban services must provide tangible benefits and reduce costs in 
order to motivate people to monitor service delivery. Sustaining accountability depends on finding 
ways of keeping users engaged and aware of how their participation makes a difference in decision-
making and service delivery. 
 
Information collection and dissemination is often ineffective as a proxy for communication with 
service users/surrogate for political responsiveness. Communities that are presently poor in physical 
infrastructure are in danger of becoming so in information, thus compounding inequalities and 
inequities. 
 
Trust is important in service delivery, even where there is no choice in service provider. Local 
governments recognised urban service delivery as a mechanism to gain citizens’ trust.  The role of 
face-to-face communication promotes the establishment of trust and cooperation. Service providers 
must establish credibility in communities in order to build trust. 
 
Service users do not necessarily want a formal permanent voice in service delivery, but need to be able 
to re-establish accountability when necessary. Improved service outputs may be better served by 
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tailoring mechanisms to a heterogeneous user group. Service providers should consider the ‘voice’ they 
use to address service users. This voice must accommodate the different kinds of service users whilst 
remaining internally coherent and consistent. 
 
Partnerships between local government, NGOs and communities to co-produce urban services were 
successful where they coordinated activities, ensured regular communication, shared the same goals, 
set clear objectives, roles and responsibilities, and maintained enthusiasm.  Care should be taken to 
ensure the accountability of these partnerships to the community. 
 
The case studies showed that it is often in the ‘commercial’ interests of service providers to include 
accountability arrangements in their business practice. In the long run the costs of accountability 
(technical, human, financial) can be offset against the benefits of having usable infrastructure over an 
extended life cycle. Voluntary approaches to accountability can be a public relations exercise, and tend 
to have unreliable outcomes that are focused on the financial bottom line and are short termist.  
 
CONCLUSIONS  
 
The research investigated different mechanisms of accountability for urban services, including 
professional accountability in the design and delivery of services; increasing political participation in 
representative democracy; increasing user accountability; improving managerial accountability of 
service providers. The literature on accountability for urban services suggests a number of general 
conditions for the functioning of accountability.  In light of practical experience and empirical data 
from Bristol (UK), Mdantsane (South Africa), Dhaka (Bangladesh) and Seoul (South Korea), these 
assumptions were tested to see if accountability is demonstrated in the case studies in the way predicted 
by the literature.  The empirical data demonstrates that factors like multiple strategies and 
information/resource symmetries are critical to accountability and that there is partial evidence to 
support the need for sanctions, trust, incentives, self-interest, and user voice for effective service 
delivery. The research also indicates the need for greater emphasis on the operation and maintenance of 
urban services and direct accountability to service users. However the assumption that service users 
should be treated as homogenous is disputed.  The implications of the research findings for the existing 
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theory and future practice of accountability have been identified. As such, this research has provided 
better insight into the nature and provision of accountability for urban services. 
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Table 1: Research summary  
Case study 
location 
Accountability  
Problem  
Key feature of the 
initiative researched  
Accountability 
arrangement 
Finding  
Bristol Social Exclusion Unit 
demonstrates services perform 
well below national average in 
the most disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods both because of 
unfair treatment and 
inefficiency.  
Improved the design 
and delivery of 
services. 
Project 
Pathfinder  
1. Rapid improvement of service 
delivery through dedicated team, 
integrated service, and inter-
changeability of team. 
2. Importance of both decentralisation 
for accountable service delivery and 
central government initiative and 
resources. 
3. There is a lack of ability to enforce a 
response from the private sector 
partner on part of community. 
4. Accountability improved by 
community development initiatives. 
5. Pathfinder team has substantial 
discretion but new pressures to 
perform come from the community. 
Mdantsane  Issues of ineffective service 
delivery, inefficiency and lack of 
equity in service delivery.  
Increased political 
participation.  
Ward committees 1. Ward committee mechanism is 
grounded in pre-existing social 
practice (although post apartheid 
experiences of area based 
committees has been relatively 
unsuccessful). 
2. Ward Committee is a loose 
arrangement with little scope for 
residents to monitor progress of 
complaint or monitor day-to-day 
performance. 
3. Ward committees deal with 
residents’ complaints, and have a 
role in supervising and coordinating 
delivery of services in their zones. 
4. Perceived legitimacy of community 
representatives on ward committees.  
5. Community has high expectations 
and are frustrated by the slow pace of 
change. 
Dhaka  Ineffective service delivery, 
clientelism and corruption. 
Increased the 
influence of service 
users. 
Citizen Score 
card  
NGO delivery  
1. Success of scorecard crucially 
depends on the degree of follow-up 
activity and an enabling social and 
political context.  
2. Society driven accountability 
requires reformers on the ‘inside’ 
government and service providers to 
work. 
3. There is potential for active 
participation of poorest in 
accountable service delivery.  
4. User accountability can be improved 
by the institutionalisation of 
mechanisms in law/policy. 
5. There is the potential for grassroots 
pressure groups to promote integrity 
in services. 
Seoul  Widespread red tape and 
corruption in service delivery.  
Improved the 
responsiveness of 
service providers. 
Anti-corruption 
oriented 
managerial 
reform  
1. Problem of top down planning  
2. Importance of transparency in 
society  
3. More accountability has possibly 
created more dissatisfaction with 
services. 
4. Emphasis on making people more 
satisfied with the experience of using 
a service rather than improving 
quality. 
5. Greater accountability has increased 
the number of competing claims on 
financially limited resources. 
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Table 2: Summary of Findings from Testing Propositions  
Proposition for 
accountability  
The overall effect practice has on proposition  Finding   
 Comment Support  Partially 
support  
Dispute  
Multiple strategies There is a need to review how accountability is defined. 
Respondents from deprived areas use different strategies to 
cope with failing services. Accountability is not something that 
is achieved once and for all. Accountability only exists insofar 
as people make it exist by using it.  
 
X   
Information and 
other resource 
symmetries 
Information asymmetries have been reduced in service 
delivery. Information asymmetries can be reduced through 
dialogue. Accountability has a number of costs.   
 
X   
O&M doesn’t work 
in practice 
O&M of urban services is often not a priority for 
municipalities. Effective O&M was improved by partnerships 
and innovation in service delivery. Accountability also applies 
to service provider agencies. The case studies showed that the 
most important outputs of service delivery are not always 
measurable. 
 
 X  
Sanctions are 
needed for 
accountability 
In practice, service users have few sanctions to use as leverage 
to demand better services. The role of payment for services as 
a sanction in service delivery. Embedding service providers in 
communities can be a dis-incentive to front line service 
providers. Forms of accountability can be traded off against 
each other. International pressures can be effective in making 
urban service delivery accountable to citizens.  
 
 X  
Providers are 
untrustworthy 
Trust does matter in service delivery. Levels of trust vary with 
the type of service provider. 
 
 X  
Homogeneous 
service users 
Some groups in society are better placed for acting on 
accountability arrangements. Service providers have attempted 
to entrench their interests in service delivery. Focusing on 
individual accountability of front line service providers is a 
symptomatic approach to a structural problem.  
 
  X 
Service providers 
should be 
answerable to the 
community 
Accountability is shaped by broader socio-political context. 
Political accountability continues to have an important role in 
service delivery. Accountability of service providers depends 
on a degree of direct answerability to the community. Thought 
should be given to how to scale up accountability from the 
project context. The extent to which accountability have made 
society more governable is debateable. 
 
 X  
Service providers 
and users need 
incentives for 
action  
Users don’t necessarily require individual incentives to 
improve service delivery. Recognition should be give to the 
range of motivation affecting service providers. Front line 
service providers need discretion to be effective. 
 
 X  
Service providers 
and users are self-
interested  
The research showed that service providers and users are not 
necessarily self-interested. Service users and providers have 
different interests in service delivery, but may share wider 
concerns. Accountability requires a perception of shared 
responsibility. 
 
 X  
User voice is 
needed for 
effective service 
delivery 
The respondents from deprived areas thought that they did 
have a voice in service delivery. Respondents from deprived 
areas used collective rather than individual mechanisms to 
enforce accountability. Variable outcomes of complaint 
handling mechanisms. Accountability can reduce user 
satisfaction even if services meet technical targets for service 
delivery. 
 
 X  
 
